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STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON: SAFEGUARD 
OF THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution con-
fers upon each defendant in all criminal trials the right to "Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence." I Courts have acknowledged a 
defendant's right to this assistance for over a century. In State v. 
Lewis,2 for example, the prosecution charged the defendant with 
first degree murder.3 After the court denied the defendant's motion 
for a continuance, his counsel withdrew from the case, leading the 
court to appoint counsel for him.4 Counsel had to prepare the 
defendant's murder defense hastily, without the benefit of a time 
extension, and ultimately were unable to present key witnesses 
whose testimony could have exonerated the defendant. 5 The Mis-
souri Court of Appeals reversed the murder conviction,6 finding 
that the defendant's new counsel did not have a reasonable time 
period--only six days-to secure testimony of these witnesses, who 
were located elsewhere in the state.7 In affirming this reversal, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri, which referred to the defendant as "an 
ignorant colored man,"B held that former counsel had betrayed the 
defendant, and that the trial court had perpetrated a "gross 
injustice"9 in refusing to grant the continuance. 
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the constitutional mandate that such counsel be effective. 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, iO the Supreme Court held that criminal 
defendants at both the state and federal levels enjoy a right to 
counsel guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. I I The 
notion that such counsel need be "effective" to fulfill the constitu-
I u.s. CONST. amend. VI. 
• 9 Mo. App. 321 (1880). aIi'd. 74 Mo. 222 (1881). 
, 9 Mo. App. at 322. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 323. 
6 Id. at 326. 
7 Id. at 325-26. 
8 State v. Lewis. 74 Mo. 222. 227 (1881). 
9 Id. 
10 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
II Id. at 344 (Court extended Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel to State prose-
cutions. thereby establishing right of indigents to representation). 
121 
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tional requirement first appeared in McMann v. Richardson. 12 In 
McMann, the Court declared that "defendants facing felony charges 
are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel."13 Al-
though recognizing the need for effective and competent defense 
counsel, the McMann Court neglected to set a standard by which to 
determine the competence of an attorney's representation. The 
McMann Court preferred to leave the determination of defense 
counsel's competence "to the good sense and discretion of the trial 
courts."14 This entrustment of discretion fostered the development 
of numerous conceptions of "effective" counsel. 
When viewed in the light of a capital proceeding, however, the 
task of defining "effective assistance of competent counsel" takes on 
a whole new meaning: it becomes a decision of life and death 
magnitude. For the defendant facing execution, "[t]he door is open, 
but only for cases of grievous deficiency and where the court has 
serious misgivings that justice has not been done."15 The state and 
federal appeals courts' analyses must take into account the Supreme 
Court's acknowledgment that capital sentencing stands apart from 
noncapital matters. 16 Furthermore, in a capital context, the State 
must impose punishment on a principled, consistent basis, and with 
a greater degree of reliability than non capital punishment. 17 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, by relying on various lower 
court standards in judging ineffective assistance of counsel, has 
actually complicated the exercise of the capital defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right. In Strickland v. Washington,18 decided in 1984, 
the Court first attempted to establish a uniform standard for deter-
mining when defense counsel had functioned ineffectively.19 The 
12 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
13 Id. at 771 (emphasis added); see also Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser 
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1932). 
14 McMann, 397 U.S. at 771. 
15 See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196,214 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc). 
16 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (per curiam) (Stewart, J., concurring); 
see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
187 (1976)); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,110 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 
605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) 
(plurality opinion). 
17 See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-98; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 111-12; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 
604; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; Furman, 408 U.S. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
18 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). 
19 Michael P. O'Brien, Note, Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection? 
Strickland v. Washington and National Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 1985 
UTAH L. REV. 723, 723 (1985). 
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Strickland Court, in denying the appeal of a Florida capital defen-
dant, articulated a two-pronged test that defendants must fulfill to 
establish their counsels' ineffectiveness.2o First, defendants must 
prove that their counsels' representation was deficient; second, de-
fendants must show that the deficient performance deprived them 
of a fair trial by prejudicing the defense.21 On the one hand, the 
Strickland Court ostensibly established a uniform standard of review 
of ineffective assistance claims. On the other, the Court eviscerated 
its own decision by furnishing vague guidelines to govern a lawyer's 
actions and by allowing the trial courts' broad discretion in devel-
oping their own standards for addressing problems arising at trial. 22 
This note focuses on the negative impact that the Strickland 
standard has had on ineffective assistance of counsel challenges 
brought by defendants in both state and federal courts. Has the 
Strickland standard safeguarded capital defendants' rights to effec-
tive assistance of counsel by providing a clear, uniform standard for 
trial courts to implement? Or has Strickland further disadvantaged 
capital defendants, not only by encouraging trial courts to continue 
to apply their own regional standards, but also by increasing the 
burden of proof upon these defendants in establishing their inef-
fectiveness claims? This note attempts to answer these questions by 
focusing on three issues. Part II treats the range of standards that 
courts utilized to determine counsel effectiveness during the years 
preceding Strickland v. Washington. Part III discusses the arrival of 
the Strickland standard, including a brief explanation of its compo-
nents. Part IV examines post-Strickland legal developments, focusing. 
on the problems the standard poses for capital defendants and how 
it has impacted those defendants attempting to challenge the effec-
tiveness of their counsel in the state courts of the South.23 This note 
concludes that, instead of safeguarding the capital defendant's right 
to effective assistance of counsel by providing a uniform national 
standard of review, the Strickland Court, through its reticence to 
declare such a forceful standard, has actually disadvantaged these 
defendants. 
20 466 U.S. at 667. 
21 /d. 
22 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Fatal Defense, NAT'L L.j., June 11, 1990, at 42. 
2S Most notably, the so-called "death belt" States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
and Texas, and on the federal level, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which handle the largest 
amount of capital cases in the federal system. See ill. 
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II. STANDARDS FOR MEASURING INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL 
PRIOR TO STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON 
A. The Evolution of the Defendant's Constitutional Right to Counsel 
The concept of execution, as well as its practical application, 
has existed in North America as far back as 1622, when Daniel 
Frank became the first colonist to be lawfully executed for the 
offense of theft.24 A defendant's right to effective assistance of 
counsel, however, has evolved primarily over the last century. Ini-
tially, the Supreme Court only recognized a defendant's constitu-
tional right to obtain counsel. 25 Not until 1932, in Powell v. Ala-
bama,26 did the Court address the scope of the right to counsel 
conferred by the Sixth Amendment. The Court mandated that 
when defendants cannot furnish their own defense-because of 
"ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like"-the State has 
the duty to provide them with counseJ.27 The Court recognized the 
provision of counsel as part of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby 
incorporating it as an integral part of procedural due process.28 By 
buttressing the defendant's right to counsel with the force of both 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Powell Court stressed 
the fundamental importance of the right to counsel in assuring 
fairness for defendants in federal and state prosecutions.29 The 
Court subsequently included indigent defendants standing trial for 
felonies in the group entitled to this right to counsel, while allowing 
them to waive such right, if they did so "freely and intelligently."3o 
24 HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3 (1982). 
25 See, e.g., Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24, 29-31 (1898). 
26 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
27 Id.at71. 
28 [d. 
29 /d. at 68, 73; see also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1985) ("right to the 
assistance of counsel guaranteed by Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is indispensable to 
the fair administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice"); Coleman v. Alabama, 
399 U.S. I, 7-10 (1970) (indigent defendant constitutionally entitled to counsel at preliminary 
hearing as well as trial); Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525, 526-33 (1961) (court's refusal 
to grant continuance until defendant's counsel arrived constituted denial of due process); 
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 473-74 (1945) (State's failure to appoint counsel violated 
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right). But see Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 136-37 
(1947) (Sixth Amendment's absolute guarantee of counsel is not made applicable to States 
via Fourteenth Amendment). 
30 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 
276,308 (1930»; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,438-40 (1963) (capital defendant's failure 
to appeal conviction is not an intelligent and understanding waiver of his right to appeal if 
not resulting from consultation with competent counsel); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 
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The shortcomings of the Fourteenth Amendment analysis, 
however, soon fell under criticism from the legal community. Be-
cause the analysis focused on the overall fairness of the proceedings, 
courts deemphasized the specific performance of counsel.31 Ac-
knowledging this analytical shortfall, the Court applied a narrower 
reading to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Betts v. Brady.32 
In Betts, the Court asserted that Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess did not confer specific Sixth Amendment guarantees upon the 
States in all cases.33 Rather, the Constitution requires that the State 
provide counsel for indigent criminal defendants only when the 
denial of such counsel would "constitute a denial of fundamental 
fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice."34 In order to 
ascertain when such a denial occurred, the Court analyzed the 
totality of the facts of each individual case.35 The Court thus shifted 
emphasis away from the overall fairness of the trial and focused 
instead on counsel's conduct. While reducing the number of situa-
tions in which the States had to provide counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment, the Betts Court also limited those situations that could 
give rise to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Gideon v. Wainwright36 marked the Court's return to the broader 
Fourteenth Amendment analysis. In directly overruling Betts, the 
Court held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was a funda-
mental right essential to a fair triaJ.37 Gideon's significance is multi-
161 (1957) (capital defendant's waiver of entitlement to counsel was not "intelligent and 
understanding" (citing Pennsylvania ex rei. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. ll6, ll8 (1956))); 
Adams v. United States ex rei. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (defendant's waiver of jury 
trial and assistance of counsel must be free and intelligent choice). 
31 See Joanne Legano, Comment, The Effective Assistance of Counsel: Chance or Guarantee? , 
II FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 87-88 (1982). 
'2 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
33 [d. at 461-62. 
'4 [d. at 462. 
35 [d. 
'6 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
37 [d. at 343-45; see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322 (1981) (State criminal 
defendants entitled to guidance of counsel at every step of proceedings); Lewis v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 55, 59 (1980); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742 (1967) (Supreme 
Court continues to adhere to principle that Fourteenth Amendment makes Sixth Amend-
ment's counsel guarantee obligatory on the States); Berry v. New York, 375 U.S. 160 (1963) 
(per curiam); Banks v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 51 (1963) (per curiam); Crews v. Wainwright, 
375 U.S. 50 (1963) (per curiam); Barnes v. North Carolina, 375 U.S. 28 (1963) (per curiam); 
Newsome v. North Carolina, 375 U.S. 21 (1963) (per curiam); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 
375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963) (per curiam); Baxley v. Wainwright, 374 U.S. 508 (1963) (per curiam); 
Palmer v. Wainwright, 374 U.S. 507 (1963) (per curiam); Holmes v. Wainwright, 374 U.S. 
506 (1963) (per curiam); Herb v. Wainwright, 374 U.S. 505 (1963) (per curiam); Auftick v. 
Wainwright, 374 U.S. 494 (1963) (per curiam); Kovner v. Wainwright, 374 U.S. 492 (1963) 
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faceted. By overruling Betts and invalidating that Court's refusal to 
extend the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel, the Gideon 
Court utilized the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that criminal 
defendants in state courts benefit from the same Sixth Amendment 
protection as their federal counterparts.38 Furthermore, the more 
exacting Sixth Amendment focus of Gideon laid the foundation for 
the idea that guaranteed representation rise to a level of minimum 
effectiveness.39 In 1970, the Court further built upon the notion of 
effective counsel in McMann v. Richardson,40 by declaring that de-
fendants facing felony charges deserve the effective assistance of 
competent counse1.41 A brief review of how various courts ensured 
"fundamental fairness" illustrates how differently such courts 
viewed the sufficiency of representation. 
B. Various Court Approaches Toward Ensuring "Fundamental Fairness" 
Almost a full century before McMann, appellate courts had 
recognized ineffective assistance claims.42 Such recognition, how-
ever, embodied an extremely rare use of judicial supervisory pow-
ers.43 Courts subsequently tied the Fourteenth Amendment into 
their analyses. If a defendant's deprivation of effective assistance of 
counsel ultimately resulted in a fundamentally unfair proceeding, 
then the court would reverse a guilty verdict, considering it a due 
process violation.44 
This question of fundamental fairness led courts of the post-
World War II era to examine whether the defense counsel's rep-
(per curiam); Bryant v. Wainwright, 374 U.S. 492 (1963) (per curiam); Paige v. North 
Carolina, 374 U.S. 491 (1963) (per curiam); Laughner v. Wainwright, 374 U.S. 489 (1963) 
(per curiam); Davis v. Barmiller, 374 U.S. 489 (1963) (per curiam); Walker v. Walker, 374 
U.S. 488 (1963) (per curiam); Huggins v. Raines, 374 U.S. 105 (1963) (per curiam); Rideau 
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (defendant's right to counsel guaranteed by due 
process); Buffington v. Wainwright, 373 U.S. 543 (1963) (per curiam). 
38 See 372 U.S. at 342,344. 
39 See id. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)). But see 
generally Stephen G. Gilles, Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and 
the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1380 (1983) (author contends that Supreme Court 
has not interpreted Sixth Amendment as mandating competent defense by counsel). 
40 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
41 [d. at 771; see also Follette v. Camacho, 398 U.S. 279 (1970) (per curiam); Parker v. 
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797-98 (1970) (appointed counsel met the McMann standard 
of competence). 
42 See, e.g., State v. Gunter, 30 La. Ann. 536, 540 (1878). 
43 Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of 
Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1544, 1550 (1983). 
44 [d.; see, e.g., Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108,110-11 (7th Cir. 1957). 
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resentation was so deficient as to render the proceeding a "farce or 
mockery" of justice.45 The defendant had to prove that, during the 
course of the trial, counsel's representation-either through omis-
sions, failure to call witnesses, insufficient preparation, and the 
like-was so incompetent as to render the proceedings invalid.46 
The "farce and mockery" standard emerged as the controlling 
standard in the federal courts.47 This standard exemplified the 
prevailing notion that, except in the most egregious of circum-
stances, the verdicts of otherwise fair criminal proceedings should 
never serve a subordinate role to a defendant's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim.48 
During the World War II years, the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals espoused that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed 
only the appointment of counsel, not the appointment of effective 
counsel,49 Thus, any federal defendant waging an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel challenge had to allege a violation of the consti-
tutional due process guarantee of a fair trial,5° Eventually, the farce 
and mockery standard subsumed Sixth Amendment claims brought 
in federal court as well. 51 
The farce and mockery standard soon came under fire from 
courts, lawyers, and legal commentators. Critics called the standard 
"vague"52 and contested that it held lawyers to a lower standard of 
performance than other occupations. 53 By increasing the acceptable 
margin of attorney incompetence, the courts attenuated the link 
between appointed counsel and the due process guarantee of a fair 
45 !d.; see, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 
889 (1945); James A. Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 
19 ARIZ. L. REV. 443, 443-54 (1977). 
46 See, e.g., United States ex rei. Scott v. Mancusi, 429 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971) (conduct must "shock the conscience of the court and make the 
proceedings a farce and mockery of justice" (quoting United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 
379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950»; Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 
793 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 
F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1948); Diggs, 148 F.2d at 670. 
47 J. Gregory Mermelstein, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: Toward a Uniform 
Framework for Review, 50 Mo. L. REV. 651, 656 (1985); see, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 
F.2d 687, 693-94 (6th Cir. 1974). 
48 Mermelstein, supra note 47, at 656 (citing Harvey E. Bines, Remedying Ineffective 
Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927,929 (1973». 
49 See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). 
50 Mermelstein, supra note 47, at 656. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. (citing William H. Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a Criminal 
Case, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 238 (1979». 
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trial. The standard also ignored the fact that the bulk of an attor-
ney's work precedes the tria1.54 Most importantly, critics asserted 
that the farce and mockery standard placed an undue burden on 
defendants. 55 Not only did defendants have to establish counsel's 
ineffectiveness, but they also had to prove that this ineffectiveness 
converted the trial into a farce or mockery. 56 
The Supreme Court, through its extension of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to all indigent felony defendants in Gideon,57 
accelerated the abandonment of the farce and mockery standard. 58 
Courts could not reconcile the standard's capriciousness with the 
quality of representation to which defendants were entitled. 59 By 
1970, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals expressly 
invalidated the farce and mockery standard in Scott v. United States. 5O 
Courts subsequently devised new methods for determining coun-
sels' ineffectiveness. 
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals instituted 
the "gross incompetence" standard.61 If the defendant could estab-
lish that the gross incompetence of defense counsel precluded the 
mounting of an effective defense, then a sentence reversal would 
follow. 62 Alternatively, in the 1970 case Caraway v. Beto,63 the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the right to counsel as ensur-
ing representation that would be reasonably likely to and does in 
fact provide effective counsel. In Caraway, the defendant, accused 
of armed robbery, received only one visit from appointed counsel, 
three days before standing trial.64 During this visit-which lasted 
for only fifteen minutes-counsel not only failed to inquire if the 
defendant wanted to subpoena witnesses, but also neglected to ob-. 
ject to irrelevant and prejudicial exhibits offered by the prosecu-
tion. 65 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's granting of a 
54 Erickson, supra note 53, at 239. 
55 Mermelstein, supra note 47, at 657. 
56 Id. (citing Robert J. Conftitti, Note, A New Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29,34 (1983». 
57 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963). 
58 See Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (farce and mockery 
standard deemphasized as valid constitutional standard). 
59 Bines, supra note 48, at 929-30. 
60 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
61 Id. 
62 Bruce, 379 F.2d at 116-17. 
63 421 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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writ of habeas corpus, holding that counsel's conduct deprived the 
defendant of the effective assistance of counse1.66 
The demise of the farce and mockery standard did not lead to 
greater uniformity in defining effective counsel, however. While in 
McMann the Supreme Court emphasized the capital defendant's 
entitlement to the effective assistance of counsel,67 it left the task of 
defining the parameters of such assistance to the circuit courts.68 
This resulted in a proliferation of diverse approaches. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit utilized one such 
approach, the "reasonably competent attorney rule," in MacKenna 
v. Ellis.69 In MacKenna, the Fifth Circuit found that the State's 
appointment of two attorneys, neither of whom had practiced for 
more than five months, over the defendant's objections, coupled 
with the attorneys' flawed representation,70 compromised the de-
fendant's due process rights.71 The Fifth Circuit interpreted a crim-
inal defendant's right to counsel not as a right to errorless counsel, 
or to counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but to "counsel rea-
sonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assis-
tance."72 
In Caraway,73 the Fifth Circuit held that attorneys could not 
provide reasonably effective assistance without taking adequate time 
to familiarize themselves with the law and circumstances of the 
case.74 In so holding, the court paid special attention to the purpose 
of the adversary system: "to serve the ends of justice."75 The failure 
of defense counsel to provide an intelligent and reasonable defense 
contravenes this purpose, thereby compromising the defendant's 
constitutional entitlement to a fair trial. 
The Fifth Circuit applied the MacKenna standard in reversing 
a United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas 
denial of a habeas corpus petition in Herring v. Estelle.76 The defen-
dant in Herring escaped from prison when a guard left the jailhouse 
66 [d. at 637-38. 
67 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771 (1970). 
68 [d. 
69 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960). 
70 Counsel failed to interrogate witnesses and ensure their presence at trial and failed 
to obtain a continuance. [d. at 600. 
71 [d. at 599. 
72 [d. 
73 Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 
74 [d. at 637. 
75 [d. 
76 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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key in the prison door.77 The defendant's counsel, appointed by the 
State on the day of the trial, urged him to plead guilty to a charge 
of armed robbery, which carried a sentence of twenty-five years.78 
Counsel never apprised his client of the opportunity to plead to a 
lesser charge in connection with the defendant's escape from the 
prison, which carried a seven year sentence.79 In its decision for the 
defendant, the Fifth Circuit expressly discarded the farce and mock-
ery standard80 and applied the MacKenna "reasonably competent 
attorney" rule. The inferior preparation of defense counsel, mani-
fested in his failure to recommend the pleading option, prevented 
the defendant from receiving reasonably competent representa-
tion.8l 
Inadequate preparation of counsel also led to the Fifth Circuit's 
reversal of a habeas corpus denial by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Georgia in Baty v. Balkcom.82 In 
Baty, defense counsel represented two codefendants charged with 
armed robbery.83 Each defendant, however, adduced contradictory 
stories implicating the other in the crime.84 On the day preceding 
trial, standby counsel assumed representation of defendant Baty, 
but failed to speak with the defendant until the following morning, 
shortly before trial. 85 In addition, defense counsel failed to read the 
preliminary hearing transcript and did not interview any wit-
nesses.86 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that replacement counsel's 
lack of familiarity with the facts of Baty's case compromised the 
defendant's right to effective counsel.87 
A closer look at the numerous standards applied by the circuit 
courts of appeals reveals the patchwork approach of the federal 
court system toward defining "effective" counsel. By the early 1980s, 
the majority of circuits employed variants of the "reasonably effec-
tive assistance" standard. The First Circuit, for example, required 
77 Id. at 126. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 127. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 129. 
8. 661 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982). 
83 Id. at 392. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 392-93. 
86 Id. at 393. 
87 Id. at 394-95 (citing Kemp v. Leggett, 635 F.2d 453, 454-55 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 
1981) (per curiam»; Gaines v. Hopper, 575 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) 
(inadequate preparation of counsel is ground for finding violation of defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right). 
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that counsel provide "reasonably competent assistance."88 In United 
States v. Bosch,89 the court concluded that defense counsel's reference 
to the defendant's prior convictions stemmed from the attorney's 
neglect and ignorance.9o Because this neglect and ignorance pre-
cluded counsel from engaging in "informed professional delibera-
tion," the defendant suffered a deprivation of his right to effective 
assistance.91 
The Second Circuit, in Trapnell v. United States,92 mandated that 
counsel provide "reasonably competent assistance." The Trapnell 
court denied a convicted hijacker's ineffective counsel claim.93 Re-
luctant to second-guess trial strategy, the court held that counsel's 
failure to call three witnesses to substantiate the defendant's insanity 
defense did not compromise the representation's effectiveness.94 
The witnesses, despite their close contact with the defendant, would 
not be the best witnesses to testify as to the defendant's insanity. 95 
In fact, the court noted, the defense attorney actually chose a more 
likely avenue of success by calling witnesses who had less contact 
with the defendant, but strongly confirmed his mental instability.96 
The nature of counsels' representation and their overall impact 
on the juries' verdicts distinguish Trapnell and Bosch. In Bosch, the 
defense attorney's unreasonable preoccupation with his own theo-
ries blinded him to the reality that his admission of his client's prior 
convictions had seriously prejudiced his case.97 In Trapnell, however, 
the defense counsel consciously elected to call witnesses whom he 
felt were stronger to the defendant's case.98 Although the insanity 
defense failed, the failure of a professionally reasonable and sound 
strategy decision did not in and of itself support a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. 99 
In Dyer v. Crisp,lOo the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also 
required "reasonably competent assistance."lOl The presence of de-
88 See United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1122 (1st Cir. 1978). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1122. 
91 Id. 
92 725 F.2d 149, 153 (2d. Cir. 1983). 
93 [d. at 155. 
94 Id. at 156. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 United States v. Bosch. 584 F.2d 11l3, 1120 (1st. Cir. 1978). 
98 725 F.2d at 156. 
99 Id. 
100 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980). 
lOl Id. at 278. 
132 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:121 
fense errors at trial did not constitute a prima facie Sixth Amend-
ment violation. 102 In Dyer, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Sixth 
Amendment as guaranteeing counsel that "exercise[s] the skill, 
judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent defense attor-
ney."I03 
While the Tenth Circuit in Dyer began with a general standard 
of "reasonably competent assistance" and narrowed it to a more 
specific description involving "skill," ')udgment," and "diligence," 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a much broader "rea-
sonably effective assistance" standard in Wilson v. Cowan. 104 In that 
case, the defendant claimed that robbery victims had mistakenly 
identified him as he stood in a police lineup. lOS At trial, the defense 
attorney failed to call witnesses to substantiate the defendant's al-
ibi. 106 This failure deprived the defendant of effective representa-
tion and led to the reversal of the conviction. 107 The Sixth Circuit 
noted that the effective assistance standard required representation 
that "is reasonably likely to render and does in fact render reason-
ably effective assistance under the particular facts and circumstances 
of the case."108 
The Ninth Circuit employed a vague standard in analyzing 
Cooper v. Fitzharris.109 The court required "reasonably competent 
and effective representation."llo In Cooper, the failure of defense 
counsel to object to evidence obtained from a convicted rapist'S 
home through warrantless police searches served as part of the 
foundation of the defendant's claim of ineffective counsel. lll The 
court upheld the conviction, stating that when defendants base their 
claims upon identifiable acts or omissions by the defense attorney 
occurring during trial, they must also prove that these errors prej-
udiced the defense. ll2 This notion of the defendant's double burden 
of proving ineffectiveness and prejudice would reappear with the 
arrival of Strickland. 
102 Id. 
103 [d. 
104 578 F.2d 166, 168 (6th Cir. 1978). 
105 [d. 
106 [d. at 167-68. 
107 [d. at 168-69. 
108 [d. (citing Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974)). 
109 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane), em. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). 
IlO [d. at 1328. 
III [d. 
Il2 [d. at 1327. 
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On its face, the Tenth Circuit's "reasonably competent assis-
tance" standard seems to define counsel's effectiveness, as it frames 
the definition within the parameters of the circumstances of each 
individual case. This assumption, however, requires a caveat. The 
Tenth Circuit's definition only dictates how to apply the standard; 
the standard itself contains the same vagueness as that of the Second 
and Sixth Circuits. The distinction is purely syntactic, substituting 
"competent" for "effective." 
In United States ex rei. Williams v. Twomey,113 the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals employed a "minimum standard of professional 
representation."1l4 In reversing an Illinois district court's denial of 
a habeas corpus petition, the Seventh Circuit found that defense 
counsel, by failure to seek a continuance to investigate the role of 
a codefendant in the alleged crime,. fell short of the standard.1l5 
The court reversed the denial and granted the habeas petition. 116 
In United States v. Easter,117 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
required defense counsel to exhibit "customary skills and diligence 
[of a] reasonably competent attorney."1l8 At trial, the defense coun-
sel failed to challenge the legality of a police search of the defen-
dant's property.1l9 The court considered this failure to be egregious 
enough to sustain the ineffective assistance claim and to vacate the 
robbery conviction. 120 In so holding, the court found that counsel's 
failure to act as a reasonably competent lawyer would under similar 
case circumstances was the dispositive factor. 121 The Easter court, 
like the Sixth Circuit in Wilson, utilized a case-by-case approach in 
analyzing counsels' conduct. Once again, however, the court did 
little to clarify the nebulous "customary skills and diligence" com-
ponent of the standard. 122 
In the Eleventh Circuit, prior to Strickland, counsel had to be 
reasonably likely to and render effective assistance in fact, as seen 
in Goodwin v. Balkcom.123 In Goodwin, the court found that a Georgia 
m 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975). 
114 Id. at 640. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976). 
118 Id. at 666. 
119 Id. at 665. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 666 (citing Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1975». 
122 Id. (Eighth Circuit states that a competent trial lawyer "should be able to properly 
prepare and defend a criminal case," but does not elaborate as to what this preparation 
entails). 
125 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir. 1982), cm. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983). 
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capital defendant's appointed counsel had not rendered such ass is-
tance. 124 The court noted that the defense attorney's failure to 
examine the procedures for jury selection prevented him from 
objecting to conspicuous racial and gender disproportions on the 
jury; additionally, his failure to investigate the defendant's case 
directly precluded a second defense. 125 Considered separately, these 
errors constituted poor judgment. When taken together, however, 
the court determined that they deprived the defendant of effective 
assistance of counsel. 126 The court set aside the death sentence and 
remanded for a new trial. 127 
The Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals preferred the 
"normal competency"128 and "checklist"129 approaches, respectively. 
In the Third Circuit, in Moore v. United States,130 defense counsel 
had to demonstrate a degree of professionalism equal to a standard 
of "normal competency." 131 Counsel need not be extraordinary, 
merely competent enough so that the court would not have to 
intercede to correct incompetent assistance. 132 Interestingly, the 
Third Circuit explicitly disregarded the prejudice requirement l33 
set forth in the Ninth Circuit. 134 For the Third Circuit, "the ultimate 
issue is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's act 
or omission, but whether counsel's performance was at the level of 
normal competency."135 
The Fourth Circuit's checklist approach ranked as the most 
detailed of all circuit court approaches.136 The court's checklist ap-
proach required that defense counsel perform a list of duties, in-
cluding providing sufficient time to prepare their defense before 
the commencement of the trial, investigating all leads thoroughly, 
124 [d. at 817. Counsel failed to examine jury selection procedures in the county before 
trial and did not probe sufficiently into the facts surrounding the defendant's arrest, pre-
cluding a probable cause defense. [d. 
125 [d. 
126 [d. 
127 [d. at 820. 
128 See Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3rd Cir. 1970). 
129 See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544-45 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 
1011 (1978). 
130 432 F.2d 730. 
13l [d. at 737. 
132 See id. 
133 [d. 
134 See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 974 (1979). 
135 Moore, 432 F.2d at 737. 
136 Mermelstein, supra note 47, at 658. 
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apprising defendants of their rights, and meeting personally with 
the defendants as often as defense preparation required. 137 In Mar-
zullo v. Maryland,138 the Fourth Circuit reversed a denial of a habeas 
corpus petition. 139 It acknowledged that the application of specific 
professional standards140 to the disputed conduct could assist in an 
effective appraisal of counsel's normal competence. 141 The Marzullo 
court concluded that the defense counsel's failure to move to ex-
clude the jury upon the dismissal of the state's first indictment, 
coupled with his waiver of peremptory challenges, placed his con-
duct "outside the range of competence expected of attorneys in 
criminal cases," and hence deprived the defendant of his constitu-
tional entitlement to effective counsel. 142 
In summary, until the 1980s, federal courts continued to apply 
their own particular standards for defining the effectiveness of 
counsel's assistance. In 1983, however, through its review of Wash-
ington v. Strickland,143 the Eleventh Circuit formulated a modified 
standard. The Supreme Court's subsequent review of this case 
ranked as the first attempt by the Court to knit disparate state and 
federal standards together and establish uniformity in reviewing 
ineffectiveness claims. 144 
III. THE ARRIVAL OF THE STRICKLAND STANDARD 
A. Strickland v. Washington: Case History 
The defendant in Strickland, 145 David Washington, faced 
charges of kidnapping and murder. 146 The State of Florida pro-
137 See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). 
138 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978). 
139 [d. at 541, 547. 
140 The court mentions precedents from State and federal courts, American Bar Asso-
ciation standards, and, in some cases, expert witness testimony. [d. at 544-45. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. at 547. 
143 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en bane), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 
U.S. 1267 (1984). On Oct. I, 1981, the Fifth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals 
was divided into the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. This case was decided during the 
transitional period leading to this reorganization, and is properly cited as "5th Cir. Unit B." 
Currently, "5th Cir. Unit B" cases are binding only in the Eleventh Circuit. See Gredd, supra 
note 43, at 1544 n.!. This note adheres to the citation form of "5th Cir. Unit B," but in 
discussing the case, refers to the decision as one made by the Eleventh Circuit. 
144 O'Brien, supra note 19, at 723. 
145 466 U.S. 668 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267. 
146 [d. at 672. 
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vided the defendant with experienced counsel. 147 Acting against 
counsel's explicit advice, Washington voluntarily confessed and 
waived his right to an advisory jury.148 Prior to the sentencing 
hearing, the appointed attorney did attempt to locate character 
witnesses to testify at the proceeding, but none ever appeared. 149 
Furthermore, counsel also failed to request a psychiatric examina-
tion of the defendant. 150 As a result, the defense presented no 
mitigating evidence at the hearing, and Washington received the 
death sentence. 151 
Washington subsequently waged an unsuccessful ineffective as-
sistance challenge of the conviction through the Florida court sys-
tem and eventually filed a petition for habeas relief in federal 
district court. 152 The district court also denied relief, on the grounds 
that although the defense attorney did err by not investigating the 
mitigating evidence more thoroughly, it was a harmless error, re-
sulting in no prejudice to Washington's sentence. 153 On appeal, the 
newly formed Eleventh Circuit l54 decided to rehear the case. 155 The 
Eleventh Circuit, in analyzing and ultimately rejecting Washington's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, modified its previous reason-
ableness standard. 156 The Eleventh Circuit held that, in addition to 
proving that counsel failed to render effective assistance, defen-
dants needed to establish that the deficient representation actually 
and substantially prejudiced their defense. 157 The Supreme Court's 
upholding of the Eleventh Circuit's modified standard in Strickland 
may have signaled the arrival of a uniform standard of review. 
B. The Two-Pronged Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The Supreme Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit's two-pronged 
test for reversing capital sentences on the ground of ineffective 
147 [d. 
148 [d. (according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c), a federal court may try a case with an advisory 
jury when no right to a jury trial exists. The verdicts of such juries do not bind the court. 
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (6th ed. 1990». 
149 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673. 
150 [d. 
151 [d. at 675. 
152 !d. at 678. 
153 Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 894-95, 900-0 I (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), reh'g 
denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). 
154 See supra text accompanying note 143. 
155 Washington v. Strickland, 679 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 
1267 (1984). 
156 Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1263-64 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), rev'd, 466 
U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). 
157 [d. 
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assistance of counsel. 158 First, defendants must establish that coun-
sel's representation was "deficient."159 Defendants satisfy this prong 
by showing errors committed by defense counsel that rise to such a 
serious level that they effectively deprive defendants of the counsel 
to which they are entitled under the Sixth Amendment. 16o Second, 
after establishing the deficiency of the representation, defendants 
must then prove that the deficiency prejudiced their defense. 161 
In using the reasonableness requirement for the first prong, 
the Supreme Court merely adopted the traditional test of the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits, focusing on the circumstances of each indi-
vidual case. 162 The Court required defendants to prove that their 
counsel's representation did not meet an "objective standard of 
reasonableness." 163 The Court had no problem justifying the vague-
ness of this "objective standard," stating that "the proper measure 
of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under pre-
vailing professional norms."164 In addition to enumerating the fun-
damental duties counsel owed the criminal defendant-such as loy-
alty, and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest-the Court also 
suggested prevailing American Bar Association standards as guides 
to determining reasonableness. 165 
Yet, while initially seeming receptive to an expanded and more 
detailed analysis of ineffective counsel claims, the Court tempered 
its opinion by forcing the defendant to overcome "a strong pre-
sumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of rea-
sonable professional assistance."166 The Court refused to use hind-
sight to scrutinize and regulate every tactical decision or judgment 
made by defense counsel. 167 The vague nature of the reasonableness 
component of the Strickland standard indicates the Court's reticence 
158 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
159 Id. 
160 !d. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 688; see, e.g., Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 804 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983) (totality of circumstances); Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391,394 
(5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), art. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982) (reasonableness standard); 
Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276, 278-79 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981), cert. denied, 454 
U.s. 899 (1981) (reasonableness standard); Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. Unit 
A Apr. 1981) (totality of circumstances). 
163 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
164 !d. 
165 !d. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980». 
166 Id. at 689 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, IOJ (1955) (defendant must 
overcome presumption that counsel's conduct is "sound trial strategy")). 
167 Id. 
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to intrude upon the attorney/client relationship.168 The Court ac-
knowledged that "[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would 
not defend a particular client in the same way,"169 and hence, it 
refused to force a predetermined strategy on every defense attor-
ney. Furthermore, the Court applied a restrictive analysis of the 
Sixth Amendment as a whole, asserting that it is not the purpose 
of the effective assistance provision to ameliorate the quality of legal 
counsel; instead, the Sixth Amendment's overarching purpose is to 
insure that criminal defendants "receive a fair trial."170 
A closer reading of the Strickland opinion, however, reveals the 
Court's conservative viewpoint. On the one hand, the Court strictly 
interprets the Sixth Amendment as requiring counsel that will 
merely perform reasonably "under prevailing professional 
norms."171 Yet, the purpose for which said counsel exists, to provide 
the defendant with a fair trial,172 also constitutes a broader due 
process concern, which the Strickland Court fails to clarify. 
C. Another Burden for the Defendant: The Harmless Error Rule 
The second prong of the Strickland test, the prejudice require-
ment, departs from the traditional outcome-determinative method 
employed in death penalty cases. 173 Under the outcome-determi-
native test, defendants needed to demonstrate that their represen-
tation fell below acceptable standards to such an extent that it more 
likely than not affected the decision in the case. 174 This standard 
enabled the state to prevail if it could prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the alleged error(s) in question were "harmless," or did 
not influence either the defendant's conviction or sentencing. 
The Supreme Court upheld a number of death sentences by 
employing this harmless error analysis prior to Strickland. In Hopper 
v. Evans,175 a defendant received a death sentence for intentionally 
killing a robbery victim based upon a state statute that prohibited 
168 O'Brien, supra note 19, at 732. 
169 Strickland, 466 u.s. at 689. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 688. 
172 Id. at 689. 
17' See Thomas Hagel, Toward a Uniform Statutory Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel: 
A Right in Search of Definition After Strickland, 17 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 203, 210-11 (1986). 
174 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,22 (1967); see also United States v. Decoster, 
624 F.2d 196,215 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane). 
175 456 U.S. 605 (1982). 
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jury instruction on a lesser offense.176 The Court invalidated a 
similar statute in an earlier case, Beck v. Alabama,177 reasoning that 
an uninstructed jury would arrive at an unjustified murder con vic-
tion. J78 Although the Hopper defendant's death sentence arose un-
der a statute declared unconstitutional in Beck, the Court upheld 
both the conviction and the sentence. 179 The Court reasoned that a 
statute prohibiting instruction of the jury on a lesser offense violates 
the defendant's constitutional rights only when evidence exists that 
could reasonably result in a verdict of guilt for a lesser offense. 18o 
In so doing, the Court limited Beck to those cases in which such 
supporting evidence exists. 181 In Hopper, the Court did not deem 
such evidence to exist, as the defendant's own testimony-that he 
would kill again, if necessary--completely negated any need for a 
jury instruction on the offense of unintentional killing. 182 The lack 
of jury instruction constituted harmless error, because the circum-
stances of the defendant's case would not have warranted jury 
instruction anyway.183 
In Zant v. Stephens,184 the Court again upheld a death sentence, 
despite the incorrect classification of one of its circumstances as a 
statutory aggravating circumstance. 185 The defendant, who had es-
caped from a Georgia jail while serving several sentences for nu-
merous robberies, engaged in a crime spree that included an armed 
robbery, a pair of car thefts, and ultimately, murder.186 At trial, the 
prosecution urged conviction based on three aggravating circum-
stances: first, that the murder defendant had a developed history 
of criminal assault convictions; second, that this murder involved 
an aggravated battery to the victim; 187 and third, that the defendant 
176 [d. at 607-08, 612 (statute classified a homicide committed in the act of a robbery as 
a noncapital offense. See ALA. CODE § 13-1-70 (1975)). 
177 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980). 
178 [d. 
179 Hopper, 456 U.S. at 613-14. 
180 [d. at 610. 
181 [d. 
182 [d. at 612-13. 
18' [d. at 613. 
184 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
185 [d. at 864. Aggravating circumstances are those which, although beyond the essential 
requirements for the existence of a particular tort or crime, tend to add to its irtiurious 
consequences. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 65 (6th ed. 1990). 
186 Zant, 462 U.S. at 864-65. 
187 The defendant murdered the victim by shooting him twice in the head at point blank 
range. [d. at 865. 
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who committed the murder had escaped from jail. 188 After the trial 
court convicted the defendant, the Georgia Supreme Court de-
clared that Arnold v. State 189 invalidated the first of these aggravating 
circumstances, dealing with the defendant's criminal history, as "un-
constitutionally vague."190 In Arnold, however, no other mitigating 
circumstances existed. 191 The Court considered such error "incon-
sequential," however, because the jury was correctly allowed to con-
sider the two other circumstances that were statutorily aggravat-
ing. 192 Last, in Barclay v. Florida,193 the state court issued a death 
sentence based upon statutory aggravating circumstances. 194 Despite 
later invalidation of one of the circumstances, the Court allowed 
the state court to uphold the sentence based on harmless error 
principles. 195 
The Strickland Court, however, applied a stricter "reasonable 
probability" standard. 196 The Court held that "[t]he defendant must 
show that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 197 The Court in Strickland denied 
Washington's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the dual 
grounds that the defendant failed to establish both deficient per-
formance of counsel and sufficient prejudice. 198 
Harmless error analysis has also played a role in post-Strickland 
capital developments as the Court demonstrated in Satterwhite v. 
Texas. 199 In this case, the defendant stood charged with murder 
allegedly committed during a robbery.20o In an effort to establish 
the defendant's propensity for future violence, the prosecution sub-
mitted into evidence the results of a psychiatric examination, with-
out first informing the defense. 201 After receiving the death sen-
tence, the defendant appealed, claiming that the prosecution's 
188 Id. at 864. 
189 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976). 
190 Id. at 391-92. 
191 Arnold. 224 S.E.2d at 39l. 
192 Id. at 888-89. 
193 463 U.S. 939 (1983). 
194 Id. at 944-45. 
195 Id. at 958. 
196 Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 694, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). 
197 Id. (emphasis added); see also Hagel, supra note 173, at 21l. 
198 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698-700; see also Charles W. Hess, Comment, Constitutional 
Law: The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 360,374 
(1985). 
199 486 U.S. 249 (1988). 
200 Id. at 252. 
201 Id. at 254. 
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action violated his Sixth Amendment right to consult with coun-
sel.202 The Satterwhite Court held that the prosecution's action vio-
lated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right and, after a harmless 
error analysis, reversed the death sentence on the ground that it 
could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
influence the sentencing jury. 203 
The arrival of Strickland presented the possibility for uniform 
standardization of tests for ineffective assistance of counsel. Osten-
sibly, by subsuming the disparate appellate and state court standards 
into one consistent, two-pronged test, the Court could ensure that 
the capital defendant would receive a fair trial, without having to 
expand the scope of the effective counsel guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment. When considered in light of the developments during 
the 1970s and 80s, however, Strickland has not promoted uniform 
due process fairness, but rather has narrowed the practical scope 
of the Sixth Amendment. 
IV. THE IMPACT OF STRICKLAND ON CAPITAL DEFENDANTS 
A. Laying the Foundation: Supreme Court Death Penalty Cases, 
1970-84 
The 1970s marked a decade of unparalleled Supreme Court 
attention to capital punishment proceedings. The interplay between 
the Court, state judiciaries, and legislatures during that period 
would shape American death penalty decisions well into the 1980s. 
The Court set the tone in 1972, when it struck down as unconsti-
tutional three state capital punishment statutes that afforded juries 
unlimited latitude in deciding when to impose the death sentence.204 
The Furman Court reasoned that if juries have standardless latitude 
they could impose the death penalty arbitrarily, in violation of the 
Constitution.205 As Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurrence, 
the statutes violated the Constitution in their functioning because 
they led to the imposition of the death penalty on a disproportionate 
202 [d. at 251. 
203 [d. at 258-60. 
204 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
205 [d. at 240-57 (Douglas,]., concurring); id. at 306-lO (Stewart,]., concurring); id. at 
310-14 (White,]., concurring). 
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number of poor and minority defendants. 206 Such a penalty violates 
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. 207 Thus, the Court established the important principle that 
the imposition of the death penalty in a careless, undisciplined 
manner qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment.20B 
The Supreme Court acted similarly when it vacated the death 
sentence given to a criminal defendant in Caldwell v. Mississippi. 209 
In that case, prior to dosing argument, the prosecution addressed 
the jury, assuring them that the ultimate responsibility for sentenc-
ing the defendant to death rested not with them, but with the 
appellate court.210 Because the appellate court could review their 
decision, they should not feel inhibited by any pangs of guilt at the 
prospect of returning a death sentence. 211 Unfortunately for the 
prosecution, this reassurance not only misstated Mississippi law, but 
also lowered the jury's collective sense of responsibility for arriving 
at a death sentence.212 Just as the Furman Court felt compelled to 
act to protect the defendant's Eighth Amendment freedom from 
cruel and unusual punishment, so too did the Caldwell Court.213 
The possibility, regardless of how slight it may be, that the jury 
sentenced the defendant to death based on a lack of responsibility 
violated the standard of reliability required by the Eighth Amend-
ment. 214 
Furman attempted to eliminate arbitrariness from state death 
penalty schemes. After Furman, state response took two forms. Un-
der mandatory death sentencing schemes, death represented the 
only punishment available for certain offenses, principally first de-
206 [d. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: 
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.V.U. L. REV. 299, 307 (1983). But see 
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 2771-72 (1989) (neither Eighth Amendment nor Due 
Process Clause requires State to appoint counsel for indigent defendants seeking post-
conviction relief). 
207 Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring). But see Murray, 109 S. Ct. at 2770-
71 (neither Eighth Amendment nor Due Process Clause requires distinction between rights 
of capital and noncapital defendants). 
208 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). 
209 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985). 
210 [d. at 325. 
211 [d. 
212 !d. at 330. 
213 [d. at 341. 
214 [d.; see also Rogers v. Ohio, 474 U.S. 1002 (1985) (sentence vacated and case remanded 
following Caldwell); Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitution-
ality of Capital Statutes That Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. 
REV. 283, 292-93 (1989). 
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gree murder.215 The sentencer had no discretion whatsoever, be-
cause the option of life imprisonment no longer existed.216 Alter-
natively, guided discretion schemes allowed juries some discretion 
by permitting a death sentence only in cases that fit particular 
categories.217 With some variations, such statutes provided for sep-
arate guilt and sentencing proceedings-known as "bifurcated 
trials"-and mandated review by the sentencer of all relevant cir-
cumstances, both aggravating and mitigating.218 The courts encour-
aged a case-by-case analysis of the circumstances by providing juries 
with specific guidelines to aid them in their sentencing decisions.219 
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the con-
stitutionality of the mandatory and guided discretion schemes. In 
the cases of Woodson v. North Carolina220 and Roberts v. Louisiana,221 
the Court declared that mandatory death sentences violate the cap-
ital defendant's right of protection against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.222 The Court pinpointed the major constitutional defi-
ciency inherent in the mandatory scheme, namely, rigidity.223 Such 
a statute, the Court reasoned, disregards any attendant circum-
stances involved in the commission of a crime. Under this rigid 
scheme, all convicted persons must die. In addition, the Court 
upheld the right of the criminal defendant to have the jury consider 
not only the circumstances surrounding the offense, but also the 
character and record of the individual offender.224 According to 
the Court, the Eighth Amendment mandates this consideration as 
"a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the 
penalty of death. "225 
215 See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Rockwell v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101 (1976) (en 
bane), reh'g denied, L.A. 30645 (Jan. 5, 1977). 
216 See Goodpaster, supra note 206, at 308. 
217 [d. 
218 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163-64; see also Goodpaster, supra note 206, at 
310-11. 
219 See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); 
Gregg, 428 U.S. 153. 
220 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
221 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
222 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288 (Eighth Amendment mandates that State's power to punish 
is "exercised within the limits of civilized standards" (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion))); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336; see also Goodpaster, supra note 206, at 
308. 
223 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
224 [d. 
225 [d. 
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In contrast to its ruling on the mandatory laws, the Supreme 
Court upheld the guided discretion statutes.226 This bifurcated, 
case-by-case review distinguished the guided discretion statutes 
from their mandatory counterparts. For example, in Gregg v. Geor-
gia, the statute provided a special review procedure that enabled 
the Georgia Supreme Court to obtain a written report from the 
trial judge.227 This report included questions regarding the capa-
bility and competence of the defendant's representation.228 The 
United States Supreme Court, largely on the strength of these 
procedural safeguards, upheld the guided discretion statutes and 
clearly emphasized the need for full disclosure and review of per-
missible evidence by the sentencer in all capital proceedings.229 
B. Viewing Strickland in Light of Death Penalty and Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Issues 
The Strickland standard establishes a two-part test for deter-
mining the ineffectiveness of defense counsel. 230 First, defendants 
must prove deficiency of counsel; second, defendants must establish 
that the deficiency deprived them of their constitutional entitlement 
to a fair trial by prejudicing the defense.231 The Court intimates 
that the reasonable probability test places a less onerous burden on 
the defendant than does the traditional outcome-determinative 
test.232 In this manner, to a very limited extent, the post-Strickland 
Court has manifested a commitment to affording increased protec-
tion of the capital defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective 
counsel. 233 
In Skipper v. South Carolina,234 for example, the State of South 
Carolina did not allow a convicted murderer and rapist to offer 
testimony confirming his good behavior while awaiting his sentenc-
226 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 V.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 V.S. 242 (1976); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 V.S. 153 (1976). 
227 Gregg, 428 V.S. at 167. 
228 [d. at 167-68 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(a) (Michie 1975». 
229 See Jurek, 428 V.S. at 276. See generally Lockett v. Ohio, 438 V.S. 586 (1978) (plurality 
opinion) (case-by-case sentencing is imperative to assure constitutionality of death statutes 
and sentences alike). 
2S0 Strickland v. Washington, 466 V.S. 668, 687, reh'g denied, 467 V.S. 1267 (1984). 
2Sl /d. at 693; see also Hess, supra note 198, at 375. 
2S2 Strickland, 466 V.S. at 693-94; see also Hagel, supra note 173, at 211. 
2SS See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 V.S. I (1986); see also W.S. WHITE, THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 
183 (1987). 
254 476 V.S. I (1986). 
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ing hearing in prison.235 The Supreme Court held that this prohib-
ition violated the defendant's right to present all relevant mitigating 
evidence prior to the imposition of punishment.236 By reversing the 
death sentence,237 the Court upheld the defendant's right to present 
mitigating evidence during trial and sentencing proceedings.238 In 
Eddings v. Oklahoma,239 the Court once again reversed a death sen-
tence. 240 It held that the state, by prohibiting a convicted murderer 
from introducing evidence of a traumatized childhood, deprived 
the defendant of his right to the jury's specific consideration of 
mitigating factors. 241 
The Skipper and Eddings decisions acknowledge that state and 
federal courts wield the final authority in deciding what evidence 
most impacts a circumstantial analysis of a capital offense. Both 
decisions, however, also feature a Court actively trying to ensure 
maximum reliability on the validity of death sentences.242 As these 
decisions illustrate, the Court does not, and will not, defer to the 
rules or judgments of the lower courts if it sees them as contraven-
ing the maximum reliability objective. 
Strickland deviates from this trend, however. The Strickland 
Court did not promote the right of the capital defendant over the 
smooth functioning of the current capital system.243 Instead, the 
Strickland Court linked the first prong of the standard, the reason-
ableness standard, with a strong presumption in favor of the attor-
ney's adequate representation.244 Yet, under the reasonableness 
standard, the success rate for ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
is extremely low.245 
Regarding the second prong, not since Furman in 1972 had the 
Supreme Court based the overturning of a constitutionally ques-
235 476 U.S. at 4. 
236 Id.; cf Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)). 
237 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8-9. 
238 Id. at 8. 
239 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
240 Id. at 117. 
24' Id. at 110-113 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)). 
242 See also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (Court set aside death 
sentence where defendant was precluded from presenting mitigating evidence not enumer· 
ated in Florida State statute). 
243 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). 
244 Id. 
245 See Hagel, supra note 173, at 211 (citing David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of 
Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 20-33 (1973); Bines, supra note 48, at 927-39; Joel Jay Finer, 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1077-81 (1973)). 
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tionable capital sentence upon a mandatory proving by the defen-
dant of prejudice.246 The Strickland Court had no objection to the 
fact that the harmless error test could allow errors to have a trivial 
effect on the factual findings at a capital trial.247 The Court posited 
that the "ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding."248 Because the fairness of the capital 
proceeding hinges on the nature of the entire range of circumstances 
and evidence presented at trial, however, it is possible that defense 
counsel could commit numerous flagrant errors. If indeed the pros-
ecution's damaging evidence sufficiently overrides these errors, a 
court would most likely find the representation adequate to fulfill 
the constitutional requirement for effective assistance of counsel 
because of the defendant's inability to fulfill the second prong of 
the test. 249 As the Court stated, "an error by counsel, even if profes-
sionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment 
of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judg-
ment."250 This presumption narrows the spectrum of circumstances 
giving rise to a viable ineffective assistance of counsel action251 and 
simultaneously increases the capital defendant's burden of proof. 
This presumption creates an inchoate leaning toward the state, 
which effectively blurs the distinctions between noncapital cases and 
death penalty trials. It seems only logical that triers of fact also 
overlook the finality that attaches to capital proceedings, and sets 
them apart from noncapital criminal trials. 
246 Gredd, supra note 43, at 1563-64 (citing Lockett v. Ohio. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) 
(plurality opinion); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
247 466 U.S. at 695-96. 
248 [d. at 696. 
249 Hagel, supra note 173, at 212. 
250 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,364-65 
(1981». 
251 See generally Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1986) (mere fact that counsel 
failed to recognize factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise claim after recognizing 
it, is not de facto cause for procedural default); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184-87 
(1986) (capital defendant's ineffective counsel claim did not overcome reasonableness prong 
of Strickland standard, or the presumption that defense counsel's challenged action was 
"sound trial strategy"); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164-66, 175-76 (1986) (defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is not violated when attorney refuses 
to cooperate with defendant in presenting perjured testimony at trial); United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (incompetence of defense counsel warrants new trial only 
if such incompetence influenced outcome of trial (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694». But see 
Mintzes v. Wilson, 469 U.S. 926 (1984); Wainwright v. Douglas, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984); 
Strickland v. King, 467 U.S. 1211 (1984) (cases remanded for further consideration pursuant 
to Strickland). 
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The strong presumption against prejudice that the Strickland 
Court weaved into the prejudice requirement further disadvantages 
many capital defendants.252 The Court justifies the imposition of 
this requirement as a means of culling out invalid ineffective assis-
tance claims.253 Because of the disadvantaged economic position of 
the majority of capital defendants, most lack the money to obtain 
the accomplished legal counsel necessary to win an ineffective as-
sistance claim.254 Lacking the funds to retain an attorney sufficiently 
skilled to overcome the prejudice requirement, the aggrieved de-
fendants effectively forfeit their Sixth Amendment right in the 
name of judicial economy.255 
Furthermore, the Court's decision in Strickland contradicted its 
previous emphasis on the need for higher levels of reliability and 
analysis in capital proceedings versus noncapital matters.256 In the 
capital context, the defense counsel and judge rank as the only 
people standing between the defendant and death. Yet, the Strick-
land Court, in discussing the role of capital counsel, failed to ac-
knowledge the supreme importance of the capital defense attorney 
over and above the noncapital trial lawyer; the Court turned away 
from the acknowledgment that the stakes are higher in the capital 
context.257 The vagueness of the standard, particularly the prejudice 
requirement, creates a procedural obstacle to the capital defendant, 
thereby resulting in a life and death distinction based solely upon 
the quality of the defendant's counsel.258 The Court likewise failed 
252 Hagel, supra note 173, at 212. 
m Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see also O'Brien, supra note 19, at 735. 
254 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
255 See O'Brien, supra note 19, at 735; see also Hagel, supra note 173, at 212. 
256 O'Brien, supra note 19, at 737. 
257 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ("Florida's capital sentencing proceeding need not be 
distinguished from an ordinary trial"). 
258 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Kemp, 836 F.2d 1557, 1561, 1571 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, No. 
85-8570 (Mar. I, 1988), ccrt. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1264 (1988) (jury instruction unconstitution-
ally shifted burden of proof to defendant; death sentence vacated); McCorquodale v. Kemp, 
832 F.2d 543, 544-45 (lith Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 32 (1987) (defendant's 
failure to raise objection to constitutionality of sentencing instruction is not excusable; death 
sentence upheld); Potts v. Kemp, 814 F.2d 1512, 1515-16 (11th Cir. 1987) (error in jury 
instruction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, but prosecutor's improper comments 
during sentencing phase justified granting of temporary habeas corpus relief); Dobbs v. 
Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1514 (11th Cir. 1986) (capital defendant's counsel was effective); Ross 
v. Kemp, 785 F.2d 1467, 1477-78 (lith Cir. 1986) (possible negligence on part of defendant's 
attorneys remanded as jury question); Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672, 680-83 (11th Cir. 
1985) (prosecutor's questionable conduct constituted harmless error); Young v. Zant, 727 
F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (lIth Cir. 1984) (capital defendant's counsel, despite using drugs during 
trial and failing to investigate possible line of defense, did not sink to level of unconstitutional 
ineffectiveness). 
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to reconcile this line of thinking with the heightened reliability 
directive in Eddings.259 
Finally, the Strickland decision contains qualifiers on the scope 
of its effect that limit its force in promoting national uniformity of 
standards. Shortly after its issuance, some members of the legal 
community hailed the Strickland standard as a "uniform framework 
for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. "260 In bringing all of the diverse 
regional standards under the aegis of one proper standard for 
analyzing attorney performance, these commentators claimed that 
Strickland would enable trial courts to adjudicate Sixth Amendment 
cases more reliably.261 
While the Court wishes to ensure the reliability of death sen-
tences, it fails to utilize the Strickland standard as an instrument to 
accomplish this goal. As Justice O'Connor writes for the m£tiority: 
In every case the court should be concerned with whether, 
despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the 
particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in 
the ad vers a rial process that our system counts on to produce 
just results. 
To the extent that this has already been the guiding inquiry 
in the lower courts, the standards articulated today do not require 
reconsideration of ineffectiveness claims rejected under different 
standards . ... In particular, the minor differences in the lower 
courts' precise formulations of the performance standard are 
insignificant: the different formulations are mere variations of 
the overarching reasonableness standard. With regard to the 
prejudice inquiry, only the strict outcome-determinative test, 
among the standards articulated in the lower courts imposes a 
heavier burden on defendants than the tests laid down today. 
The difference, however, should alter the merit of an ineffectiveness 
claim only in the rarest case. 262 
Thus, the Court placed definite limits on the scope of the Strickland 
standard and tacitly endorsed the status quo--a multiplicity of lower 
court standards for measuring counsel effectiveness. 
To an extremely limited extent, the expectations of uniformity 
surrounding the Strickland standard have come to fruition. In Her-
259 Cf Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 
(1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam); Lockett, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) 
(plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
260 Mermelstein, supra note 47, at 662. 
261 See id. 
262 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696-97 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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nandez v. State,263 the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas adopted 
the Strickland test as the official standard for ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims under the constitution of that state.264 Three years 
later, the same court upheld a death sentence in Derrick v. State,265 
on the ground that the defense counsel's failure to object to the 
prosecutor's hypothetical statements did not fall below Strickland's 
reasonableness standard.266 
To date, only two Strickland challenges have emerged victorious 
in the Louisiana court system. In State v. Ball,267 the defendant was 
charged with second degree murder.268 During trial, the defense 
attorney failed to object to an incorrect jury instruction for second 
degree murder.269 In addition, the defense lawyer himself erro-
neously told the jury that they could convict his client based on this 
incorrect instruction.270 In performing a Strickland analysis, the 
Court of Appeal of Louisiana held that counsel's errors easily ren-
dered his performance deficient under the Sixth Amendment, and 
that the deficient representation caused prejudice to inure to the 
26' 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc). 
264 Id. at 56-57; see also Morrison v. State, 795 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); 
Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc), reh'g denied, No. 
69531 (june 27, 1990); Talamantez v. State, 790 S.W.2d 33, 37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), reh'g 
denied, No. 04-88-00581-CR (Apr. 11, 1990); Gaynor v. State, 788 S.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1990), reh'g denied, No. CI4-89-270-CR (Mar. 22, 1990), dis. rev. ref (june 27, 
1990); Doles v. State, 786 S.W.2d 741, 745-47 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Burnett v. State, 784 
S.W.2d 510, 513-15 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), dis. rev. ref, No. 05-89-00048-CR, 05-89-00049 
- CR (Apr. 4, 1990); Alfano v. State, 780 S.W.2d 494, 495-96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Salinas 
v. State, 773 S.W.2d 779, 782-83 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Washington v. State, 771 S.W.2d 537, 
545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3229 (1989); Ex parte Adams, 
768 S.W.2d 281, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 
399 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), reh'g denied, No. 3-87-221-CR (Apr. 5, 1989); Holland v. State, 
761 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), reh'g denied, No. 69647 (Oct. 19, 1988), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1560 (1989); Fair v. State, 758 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Smith 
v. State, 742 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
265 773 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), reh'g denied, No. 68969 (May 10, 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 209 (1989). 
266 Id. at 275; see also Derrick v. Collins, 741 F. Supp. 126, 129 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (defense 
counsel's decision to enter unedited transcript of defendant's murder confession into evidence 
was "tactical decision" and did not satisfy first prong of Strickland test); Solis v. State, 792 
S.W.2d 95, 98-100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc) (defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails 
under Strickland analysis); Toney v. State, 783 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), dis. rev. 
ref, No. 08-88-00233-CR (Apr. 11, 1990) (defendant fails to satisfy Strickland test); Lavigne 
v. State, 782 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant was not deprived of effective 
counsel). 
267 554 So. 2d 114 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
268 Id. at 115. 
269 [d. 
270 [d. 
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defendant.271 In a second case, State ex rei. Busby v. Butler,272 the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed a defendant's murder con-
viction, but vacated the death sentence.273 The defendant failed to 
show that counsel's conduct during the guilt phase of the trial274 
prejudiced his defense.275 During sentencing, however, the court 
found that counsel had indeed represented the defendant ineffec-
tively.276 Counsel's failure to make an opening statement, his failure 
to challenge any argument of the prosecution's case, and his failure 
to introduce any mitigating evidence rendered his representation 
below the Strickland allowance and justified a vacated sentence.277 
On the federal level, the Fifth Circuit applied the Strickland 
standard in Hawkins v. Lynaugh.278 The court conceded that the 
capital defendant could have been deprived of effective assistance 
of counsel,279 At trial, Texas capital sentencing procedures effec-
tively barred the defendant from presenting mitigating evidence of 
mental illness and an adverse childhood.280 Defense counsel failed 
to object to this exclusion and likewise failed to preserve the objec-
tion for later review.281 This failure constituted the basis of the 
defendant's ineffectiveness claim.282 After performing a Strickland 
analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendant did indeed 
have valid grounds for challenging the sentence.283 In another case, 
however, the Fifth Circuit refused to uphold a capital defendant's 
ineffective counsel challenge in Graham v. Lynaugh,284 largely on the 
ground that the trial court had defeated each of the defendant's 
allegations, ranging from failure to present certain mitigating evi-
dence to failure to provide the defendant with proper attire during 
trial.285 The Strickland standard also appeared in Riles v. McCotter,286 
271 Id. at 116-17. 
272 538 So. 2d 164 (La. 1988). 
273 /d. at 174-75. 
274 Duringjury selection, counsel failed to question prospective jurors about their stances 
on capital punishment; counsel also failed to pursue an insanity defense and neglected to 
obtain psychiatric testimony to substantiate such a defense. Id. at 168. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 173. 
277 Id. 
278 862 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 
279 Id. at 486-87. 
280 Id. at 486. 
281 Id. 
282 /d. 
283 Id. at 487. 
284 854 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1988). 
285 Id. at 721-22 (each of defendant's allegations rejected). 
286 799 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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in which the Fifth Circuit referred to it as "[t]he two-part constitu-
tional standard governing effectiveness of counsel,"287 but held that 
the capital defendant's lawyer did not act deficiently, because the 
actions of the trial court to which he failed to object were later held 
proper on appeal,288 
For the most part, however, the Strickland Court's reluctance to 
interfere with the smooth functioning of the current capital pun-
ishment system has considerably weakened its effectiveness in lead-
ing the lower courts and preserving the constitutional right to ef-
fective counse1.289 As the Court noted, "[c]ourts should strive to 
ensure that ineffectiveness claims do not become so burdensome to 
defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a 
result."290 The Court's concern for streamlining the system weakens 
what could have been a forceful national precedent. Instead, the 
Court stated that, "in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness 
of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have 
stated do not establish mechanical rules . . . the ultimate focus of 
inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding 
whose result is being challenged."291 Through its incorporation of 
a vague performance standard, a burdensome actual prejudice stan-
dard, and a tentative scope of application, the Strickland Court has 
done little to foster uniformity among the nation's courts, and in-
stead has left the capital defendant's Sixth Amendment right at the 
mercy of prevailing regional interpretation.292 
Since Strickland, the success rate for capital defendants bringing 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims has been low at every level 
of the federal and state judiciaries. Not one ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim has led to the overturning of a death sentence by the 
Supreme Court since 1984. In Bonin v. California,293 the Court de-
clined to issue a writ of certiorari to a capital defendant who alleged 
that his counsel was compromised by a conflict of interest.294 The 
fact that a human life hung in the balance did not persuade the 
majority that the defendant's counsel, who had secured the literary 
rights to his client's life story prior to the commencement of the 
2B7 [d. at 954. 
2BB [d. at 954-55. 
2B9 See WHITE, supra note 233, at 183. 
290 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). 
291 [d. at 696. 
292 See O'Brien, supra note 19, at 732. 
293 110 s. Ct. 1506 (1990) (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
294 [d. (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
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trial, could have been adversely affected professionally by this con-
flict.295 In Laws v. Armontrout,296 the capital defendant claimed that 
counsel failed to offer any mitigating evidence at trial, despite the 
attorney's knowledge of the defendant's honorable military service 
in Vietnam.297 Still, the Court remained unconvinced and denied a 
writ of certiorari.298 In some cases, the harmless error rule has 
terminated ineffectiveness of counsel claims. In Thomas v. Kemp,299 
for example, the Court held that the capital defendant's denial of 
counsel at his preliminary hearing did not substantially prejudice 
his case.300 
Challenges alleging inadequate preparation of counsel have 
also fared poorly before the Court.30l In Kimmelman v. Morrison,302 
the Court found a defendant's ineffective assistance claim to have 
merit under the first prong of the Strickland test-for failure to file 
a motion to suppress evidence303-but invalidated the challenge 
using the prejudice prong, finding that the defense counsel's incom-
petence did not prejudice his client's case.304 
At the federal appellate level, the success rate to date for capital 
defendants bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims has 
been three percent in the Fifth Circuit-one claim won, thirty-one 
denied-and twenty-five percent in the Eleventh Cir:cuit-fourteen 
claims won, forty-one denied.305 Moreover, the Southern state 
courts have shown no more receptiveness to such claims.306 The 
Florida Supreme Court has found counsel ineffective in only nine 
cases since 1984;307 Georgia, in only three;308 Louisiana, in two; 
Alabama, in one; and the Texas Supreme Court has never ruled in 
295 Id. at 1506-07; (Marshall,j., dissenting); see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783-
88, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987). 
296 490 U.S. 1040 (1989) (Marshall,j., dissenting). 
297 Id. at 1041 (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
298 Id. at 1040 (Marshall, j., dissenting); see also Messer v. Zant, 487 U.S. 1244 (1988) 
(Marshall,j., dissenting); Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026 (1987) (Marshall,J., dissenting). 
299 479 U.S. 996 (1986) (Marshall,j., dissenting). 
'00 Id. at 998 (Marshall, j., dissenting). 
'01 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Florida, 479 U.S. 972, 975-76 (1986) (Marshall, j., dissenting) 
(trial counsel's failure to provide defendant with work files not seen as deficient); Aldrich v. 
Wainwright, 479 U.S. 918-19, 922 (1986) (Marshall, j., dissenting) (inadequate preparation 
did not render counsel ineffective). 
,o2 477 U.S. 365 (1986). 
30' Id. at 383-87. 
'04 Id. at 387-91. 
'05 Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 22, at 42. 
'06 Id. 
'07 Id. 
'08 See Paul Marcotte, Snoozing, Unprepared Lawyer Cited, 77 A.B.A. j. 14, 16 (1991). 
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favor of the defendant.309 The Georgia case of Ross v. Kemp310 ranks 
as an especially disturbing example of the level to which attorney 
conduct must sink before the court will find counsel ineffective. 
Here, an aged3Jl defense lawyer, who served as an imperial wizard 
in the Ku Klux Klan, represented a black defendant in a capital 
case.312 The lawyer's representation contained numerous flagrant 
examples of ineffectiveness. Counsel fell asleep during discovery, 
failed to prepare his client for direct and cross-examinations, and 
directly contradicted defenses established by co-counsel. 313 In re-
versing the death penalty conviction, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
found that the representation violated the defendant's Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel, 
and that such violation was particularly impermissible "in a trial in 
which [the defendant's] life hung in the balance."314 Although the 
Strickland standard was heralded as a promoter of uniformity and 
a safeguard of the capital defendant's right to counsel, these figures 
indicate that the defendant virtually never wins.315 
Justice Antonin Scalia, the newly assigned administrative justice 
for the Fifth Circuit, has further complicated the dilemma for cap-
ital defendants. In a recent ruling, Justice Scalia announced that a 
defendant's lack of counsel no longer constitutes "good cause" for 
a time extension for filing a writ of certiorari in death penalty 
cases.316 Currently, capital defendants have ninety days in which to 
file a writ after the finalization of the judgment of the state court 
of appeals.317 This ruling could prompt an increase in allegations 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, for both short and long-term 
reasons. In the short-term, capital defense attorneys foresee this 
ruling as leading to an increase in hastily prepared habeas petitions 
and, in cases in which defendants have lost their lawyers after the 
309 Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 22, at 42. 
310 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990) (per curiam). 
311 Id. at 245. 
312 Marcotte, supra note 308, at 14. 
m Ross, 393 S.E.2d at 245. 
3\4 Id. at 246. 
315 One source places the number of ineffective assistance claims handled by the federal 
circuit courts of appeals since the Strickland decision at 702, as of May 30, 1988. Of this 
number, the courts have found ineffective assistance under the standard in only 30 cases, or 
4.27%. See Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard 
for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 458 (1988). 
3\6 Marsha Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Chilling Capital Appeals, NAT'L L.J., Mar. II, 1991, 
at I. 
317 Id. at 24. 
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initial loss at trial, no petitions at all. 318 Furthermore, over the long-
term, the ruling could discourage volunteer attorneys-who handle 
many capital cases on the condition that they receive adequate time 
to prepare-from taking such cases.319 As a result, this ruling could 
increase the number of ineffectiveness claims adduced by drastically 
reducing the available pool of attorneys competent to handle them. 
v. CONCLUSION 
During the 1970s, the Supreme Court took perhaps its most 
forceful steps toward actively regulating our current system of cap-
ital punishment. Its landmark decisions in Roberts v. Louisiana320 and 
Woodmn v. North Carolina,32I which invalidated mandatory death 
statutes, and those inJurek v. Texas,322 Proffitt v. Florida,323 and Gregg 
v. Georgia,324 which allowed for the guided discretion versions, set 
the stage for a system that the Court hoped would "operate more 
fairly and less arbitrarily than the old system of capital punish-
ment."325 Despite this objective, however, federal and state courts, 
in the absence of a clearly defined national standard, continued to 
apply their own variants of the "reasonable attorney" rule. The 
1982 Eddings decision exemplified the Court's acknowledgment of 
the distinction between capital and noncapital cases and announced 
its pledge to ensure that death sentences would issue only after 
heightened reliability and careful presentation and evaluation of all 
attendant circumstances so dictated. 
In theory, the basic holding of the Strickland decision-that the 
correct standard for analyzing attorney performance is reasonably 
effective assistance, after a consideration of the totality of circum-
stances of the case326-does indeed appear to safeguard the capital 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right.327 In practice, however, the 
Strickland standard, because it is comprised of a vague reasonable-
31. Id. at I. 
319 /d. 
'20 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
'21 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
322 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
m 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
'24 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
'25 WHITE, supra note 233, at 20. 
'26 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 690, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). 
mId. at 688. 
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ness standard and a difficult-to-prove actual prejudice requirement, 
has not delivered on the promise. Instead, the Court has succeeded 
only in shifting the burden of preserving the capital defendant's 
right to effective assistance of counsel from the capital system itself, 
to the shoulders of the defendant. 
Richard P. Rhodes, Jr. 

